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I. INTRODUCTION
Medicare Advantage was created in 1997 as a means "to
harness the power of private sector competition to stimulate
experimentation and innovation to create a more efficient and less
expensive Medicare system."2 It was intended to "allow beneficiaries
to have access to a wide array of private health plan choices in
addition to traditional fee-for-service Medicare . . . [and] enable
the Medicare program to utilize innovations that have helped the
private market contain costs and expand health care delivery
options. 3 But Medicare Advantage is merely an alternative to
traditional Medicare Parts A and B. It is still Medicare, governed by
the Medicare Act and funded through the Medicare Trust Fund.'
However, there is a common and prevailing public perception that
Medicare Advantage is an "opt-out" or is entirely distinct from
Medicare. 6 This misconception has led to much confusion when it
comes to applications of the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (the
MSP) in federal courts.
1. Originally named Medicare+Choice in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251, 275-327, the program was later renamed
Medicare Advantage in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 201, 117 Stat. 2066,
2176.
2. Collins v. Wellcare Healthcare Plans, Inc., No. 13-6759, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 174420, at *11 (D. La. Dec. 16, 2014) (quoting D. Gary Reed, Medicare
Advantage Misconceptions Abound, 27 HEALTH L. 1, 3 (2014)).
3. Parra v. PacifiCare of Arizona, Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (9th Cir.
2013) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-149, at 1251 (1997)).
4. See Reed, supra note 2, at 2-3.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 5-6.
14092015]
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss4/4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The MSP prohibits Medicare from making payments when
there is another responsible payer and requires the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to seek reimbursement
whenever available. Because Medicare Advantage is in fact still
Medicare, the MSP exclusion applies equally to Medicare
Advantage Organizations (MAOs). But contradictory language in
the Medicare Act makes it unclear if Congress truly intended for
MAOs to possess the same reimbursement rights as traditional
Medicare. Since about 2010, case law has trickled out of the federal
courts with many varying interpretations of MAO reimbursement
rights. While the federal courts initially applied a strict statutory
interpretation, the opinions have devolved into an extremely
liberal interpretation in favor of MAOs with little reliance on
explicit congressional intent. And although public policy does favor
doing whatever is necessary to safeguard the Medicare Trust Fund,
the courts are not the proper forums for legislative reform to
ensure Medicare's sustainability.
Unfortunately, for the time being, the precedent set by the
courts will likely control, as the government rarely initiates MSP
amendments when the law is being interpreted to its advantage.
Medicare currently enjoys a statutory priority right to full
reimbursement and is trying to share this privilege with its
Medicare Advantage contractors. The last legislative fix to the
government's MSP reimbursement rights came in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. As a response to unsuccessfully litigated MSP
recoveries by the government, Congress intervened and broadened
the definition of "self-insured" to include anyone remotely
responsible for medical payments or having touched related
insurance payments." Because the courts are currently ruling in
favor of Medicare in all forms, there is little incentive for Congress
7. See infra notes 46, 49, 53, 63, 68.
8. See generally Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 346 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2003);
United States v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866 (11th Cir. 2003). Section 301 of the
MMA was labeled a "technical amendment" but had the effect of broadening the
reach of MSP recoveries to encompass not just situations such as those where
corporations paid settlement expenses from operational accounts rather than
making formal insurance claims, but also those where insurance should have been
purchased and was not for whatever reason and the ability to recover from anyone
who received settlement funds prior to Medicare reimbursement or those in
possession of settlement funds that could have made reimbursement. See Medicare
Advantage in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003 (MMA), Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 301, 117 Stat. 2066, 2221.
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to act at this time. Therefore, it is imperative that practitioners take
the time to understand the Medicare Act to effectively litigate these
issues. Effective litigation would create conflict among the circuits,
which could lead the Supreme Court to finally intervene and clarify
once and for all exactly what rights MAOs have for MSP recoveries.
This Article proposes to analyze the current state of Medicare
Advantage recovery rights and to establish whether or not MAOs
were intended to share exactly the same recovery rights as
traditional Medicare. Because there is currently no proposed
legislation to clear up the inconsistencies in the application of the
Medicare Secondary Payer Act to MAOs, this Article will also
compare judicial outcomes to identify why the results evolved as
they have and to illustrate why those decisions appear to be in
error. Ultimately, the Article argues for legislative reform because
Medicare Advantage is still a secondary payer under the Medicare
Act and, as such, is entitled to reimbursement, through whatever
means Congress deems appropriate. Current attempts to avoid
reimbursement through exploitation of technicalities are simply a
waste of judicial resources, and inconsistent judicial outcomes spur
additional litigation. Because it is not proper for judges to legislate
from the bench as they have in these Medicare Advantage cases,
this is a problem whose resolution lies with Congress.
II. MEDICARE ADVANTAGE AND THE MEDICARE
SECONDARY PAYER ACT
A. Medicare Advantage Compared to Medicare
Medicare Advantage was created in the Balanced Budget Act• 10
of 1997.9 Originally named Medicare+Choice, the program was
designed to take advantage of private sector efficiencies to better
deliver more cost-effective health insurance benefits on behalf of
the federal government." To accomplish this, Congress created an
arrangement whereby the government would pay private health
9. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251, 275-327.
10. The program was renamed Medicare Advantage in the MMA. See supra
note 1.
11. See supra Part I. Section 238 of the MMA required the Secretary to
"conduct an evaluation of leading health care performance measures in the public
and private sectors and options to implement policies that align performance with
payment under the medicare program." § 238(a) (2), 117 Stat. at 2213-14.
14112015]
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insurers a flat rate per enrollee, referred to as a capitation rate.12
Due to provider network arrangements and other efficiencies,
private sector insurers could potentially provide care to their
enrollees for less money than what the government paid. While
some of the surplus funds would find their way back to the
beneficiaries in the form of benefits beyond those that Medicare
provides, the rest would be profit, making it a win-win situation for
the government and MAOs, as well as beneficiaries.
Congress first introduced the Medicare HMO risk-sharing
concept in 1972."3 The Secretary had been authorized to contract
with federally qualified HMOs to provide Medicare services on the
government's behalf for over four decades. However, initial
participation was low because the "risk sharing" was skewed in the
government's favor. To increase participation, Congress in 1982
established capitated payments to balance the risk sharing.1
4
Congress also created competitive medical plans (CMPs) to allow
HMOs that were not federally qualified to participate.1 By 1985,
the program finally took off as a result of these earlier interventions
but was ultimately replaced by Medicare+Choice in 1997. 6 Under
the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
(MMA) Act of 2003, the Secretary is prohibited from entering
into any new risk-sharing contracts under 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm,
essentially nullifying that section of the statute.'" The
Medicare Advantage provisions are codified under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395w-21 to -28.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2012); see also 42 C.F.R. § 422.300 (2014).
13. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L No. 92-603, tit. ii,
§§ 226(a), 278(b) (3), 86 Stat. 1329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(a) (1982). In 2010, Congress reduced "federal
payments to Medicare Advantage plans over time, bringing them closer to the
average costs of care under the traditional Medicare program." Medicare Advantage
Fact Sheet, HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (May 1, 2014), http://kff.org/medicare
/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage-fact-sheet/. Additionally, under the Affordable
Care Act of 2010, Medicare Advantage plans must maintain a "medical loss ratio of
at least 85%," thereby limiting their profits. Id. The effects of these policy changes
on the health insurance market are yet to be analyzed in detail.
15. For a general list of federal qualifications for CMPs, see 42 C.F.R.
§ 417.407. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm.
16. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395rmm(k). Section 1395mm(k) remains a part of the
Medicare Act despite the fact that the Secretary cannot enter into any new
contracts and may not renew any such contracts on or afterJanuary 1, 1999. See id.
1412 [Vol. 41:4
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Medicare and Medicare Advantage have some fundamental
similarities. The government does not provide any "direct" services
even for traditional Medicare; therefore, all Medicare benefits are
provided under contract with private sector entities. MAOs "shall
provide to members enrolled under this part... benefits under the
original [M]edicare fee-for-service program option," meaning that
they all receive the same basic benefits.' Should any beneficiary
disagree with a benefit determination, he must exhaust the
administrative remedies provided."j And both programs are
statutorily prohibited from making payments when there is another
responsible party.2 O
But because Medicare Advantage is a risk-sharing proposition
rather than fee-for-service arrangement, the similarities stop there.
The government pays MAOs a fixed capitation rate using a bidding
process under which plan providers submit estimated costs per
enrollee to Medicare. If a bid meets the necessary requirements, it
is accepted." For plans where the estimated costs exceed the
benchmark, the enrollee pays the difference in the form of
premiums.2 2 By using a fixed capitation rate, MAOs share in the risk
that beneficiaries may require treatment in excess of the amount
provided by the government. However, the MAO keeps any excess
funds as profit should the beneficiary require treatment totaling
less than the capitation rate. Because it is the beneficiary's election
and the potential for profit is greater with a larger pool of
enrollees, MAOs incentivize enrollment by providing benefits in
excess of those that traditional Medicare provides, such as dental
and vision benefits.23 The idea is to maximize enrollment to diffuse
the cost of people requiring active treatment over a large pool of
enrollees.
18. Id. § 1395w-22(a)(1)(A).
19. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.904(a). Note that while the entities that perform the
first two steps of the appeal differ slightly, the appeal process is fundamentally the
same for both programs.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2) (A). But see id. § 1395w-22(a) (4) (providing
secondary payer provisions specific to MAOs).
21. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
22. See id. (explaining further the anticipated changes in Medicare's payment
policies to Medicare Advantage plans).
23. See Medicare Advantage Plans Cover All Medicare Services, MEDICARE.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/medicare-health-plans/what
-medicare-advantage-plans-cover.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
14132015]
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As a way to ensure MAO contractors are capable of assuming
the financial risk, Congress required that an MAO be licensed in
each state in which it offers a plan. 4 An MAO must provide an
"explanation of coverage" annually, approved by the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), to enrollees that explains
the terms and conditions of the arrangement with the beneficiary.2 5
While many of the benefits provided to enrollees in Medicare
Advantage plans parallel those under traditional Medicare, MAOs
have some more flexibility in how these services are provided. Each
MAO may charge different out-of-pocket costs and develop its own
rules for how enrollees get their services. 26 For example, Medicare
Advantage HMOs may establish networks of accepted specialists
and other providers that may be broader or narrower than the
networks under traditional Medicare. As a limiting factor on the
power of Medicare Advantage, beneficiaries continue to benefit
from the maximum annual limit on out-of-pocket costs that applies
to persons enrolled in traditional Medicare.
As the details of program administration demonstrate, the
Medicare Advantage program lays out a very different
infrastructure than the contracting that occurs to provide services
for traditional Medicare Parts A and B. But fundamentally, it is
important to recognize that it is still Medicare.
B. Medicare Advantage as a Secondary Payer
Medicare is statutorily prohibited from making payments when
there is a primary payer, with the exception of payments made
when primary payment is not timely made, conditioned upon
reimbursement should primary payment responsibility be
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-25(a)(1). This license can be to operate as an
insurance company, as a health maintenance organization, as a provider-
sponsored organization, or simply as an MAO. See id. § 1395w-25(a) (1)-(2).
25. While technically not an insurance "policy" per se, the explanation of
coverage outlines the contractual obligations between the MAO and beneficiary.
26. Out-of-pocket costs that differ between Medicare Advantage plan
providers include things like monthly premiums, deductibles, coverage of monthly
Medicare Part B premiums, and copayments or coinsurance. See Costs for Medicare
Advantage Plans, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs
/medicare-health-plan-costs/costs-for-medicare-advantage-plans.html (last visited
Apr. 17, 2015) (providing a listing of common costs for Medicare Advantage
plans).
1414 [Vol. 41:4
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determined. 2' 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22 (a) (4) extends secondary payer
status to Medicare Advantage by virtue of reference to payments
made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2). 2' But the statute does
not incorporate any of the recovery provisions available at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b) (2) (B) (iii) or (iv) expressly granted to the United States.
Instead, the statute provides that an MAO "may" charge the
responsible party or a beneficiary who has received payment for
reimbursement of payments for which Medicare is prohibited from
making or had made conditionally.29 It is interesting to note that
this permission given to MAOs to bill for reimbursement appears
discretionary, whereas traditional Medicare conditional payments
made by the Secretary "shall be" conditioned on reimbursement.
If Congress were truly concerned about the recovery of payments
made from the capitated payments to MAOs, it could have easily
required that an MAO bill the responsible party, but instead, it
merely granted MAOs permission to do so.
42 C.F.R. § 422.108 specifically covers MSP procedures for
MAOs. It states that CMS does not pay for services when Medicare
is not primary and lays out responsibilities of MAOs to identify and
coordinate benefits with primary payers, reemphasizing the idea• 32
that MAOs are making payments on behalf of CMS. Interestingly,
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2) (2012 & Supp. 1 2013).
28. For more information on secondary payer rules, see 42 U.S.C. § 422.108
(2012). See generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & OTHER
HEALTH BENEFITS: YOUR GUIDE TO WHO PAYS FIRST (2014), available at http://www
.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/02179.pdf.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(a) (4).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a Medicare+Choice
organization may (in the case of the provision of items and services to
an individual under a Medicare+Choice plan under circumstances in
which payment under this subchapter is made secondary pursuant to
section 1395y (b) (2) of this title) charge or authorize the provider of
such services to charge, in accordance with the charges allowed under
a law, plan, or policy described in such section-
(A) the insurance carrier, employer, or other entity which under such
law, plan, or policy is to pay for the provision of such services, or
(B) such individual to the extent that the individual has been paid
under such law, plan, or policy for such services.
Id.
30. Id. § 1395y(b) (2) (B) (i).
31. 42 C.F.R. § 422.108 (2014) (Medicare secondary payer (MSP)
procedures).
32. See id. § 422.108(a)-(f) (discussing, inter alia, the responsibilities of
14152015]
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subsection (b) states that the "MA organization must" identify
primary payers and amounts owed,33 thereby demonstrating that
Congress is capable of using mandatory language. Yet subsections
(c), (d), and (e) employ discretionary language: "[an] MA
organization may bill" for covered Medicare services. When used
in such close proximity, one cannot help but infer that the word
selection was intentional.
It stands to reason that the government can require its
contractors to consistently coordinate benefits in the same manner
as the traditional program so that all beneficiaries receive the same
base-level benefits and exclusions. But federal funds are not in play
with regard to the MAO recovery itself since such reimbursements
are not returned to the Medicare Trust Fund. Part of the risk
sharing is that MAts are paid a fixed capitation rate, whether
beneficiaries seek medical treatment or not, and whether MAts
collect from third parties or not. 5 The manner and extent to which
an MAO elects to pursue its third-party recoveries are business
expenses that should have factored into its benchmarks when
bidding to be an MAO. How MAOs conduct their ordinary course
of business determines how much profit they can make contracting
as an MAO and is not Congress's concern, so long as Medicare
beneficiaries receive the guaranteed benefits provided by law. If the
principles of Medicare Advantage were founded on the idea that
private sector insurance companies can deliver health care benefits
more efficiently than the federal government, one has to assume
that they are just as efficient and knowledgeable about recovering
liens from responsible third parties.
C. The Practical Problem with MAOs
Beside the statutory and regulatory differences, MAOs simply
operate differently than traditional Medicare. Historically,
practitioners have always treated MAOs like private sector
insurance companies, and MAOs responded in kind by acting as
MAOs, procedures for collecting funds from entities other than the government,
and the relationship between MAO rules and state laws).
33. Id. § 422.108(b) (emphasis added).
34. Id. § 422.108(c)-(e) (emphasis added).
35. Note that the capitation rate is reduced in secondary payer situations
based solely on the assumption that, with another primary source of insurance, the
covered Medicare expenses would be less, and therefore CMS should not have to
pay as much for the MAO to assume responsibility for such a beneficiary.
[Vol. 41:41416
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such. Payments made by MAOs were generally treated as liens, and
state subrogation laws applied. Medicare conditional payment
resolutions were considered reserved for traditional Medicare Part
A and B claims, mainly because many people do not consider
Medicare Advantage to be the same as traditional Medicare. Under
the opt-out perspective described above, Medicare Advantage has
typically been treated like, and acted like, any other form of private
medical insurance.
But the real source of this problem is that CMS does not treat
Medicare Advantage like traditional Medicare. There exists a real
lack of communication between CMS and MAOs, a result of the
fact that CMS is truly far removed from MAO claims. While it is
true that the federal government does not provide direct care in
either traditional Medicare or Medicare Advantage, CMS does
maintain control of traditional Medicare, whereas MAOs are left to
administer their own benefits. Because MAOs maintain their own
claim information, CMS has no way of knowing if conditional
payments have been made by an MAO. If a practitioner were to
contact the proper CMS contractor regarding conditional
payments for a Medicare Advantage enrollee, they would simply
receive notice that it had no record of any conditional payments in
need of reimbursement. The contractor does not elaborate that the
reason is because the beneficiary was enrolled in Medicare
Advantage and that they do not have access to those records. As a
result, many practitioners check the box that they resolved their
"Medicare liens," disburse funds and go on with life, leaving an
unknown Medicare Advantage plan unknowingly unreimbursed.
Even more confusing is the fact that CMS does not share
Section 111 Mandatory Insurer Reporting (MIR) information with
31
MAOs to assist in coordination of secondary payer provisions.
With nearly 150 data fields provided in MIR reporting, CMS knows
everything about an ongoing medical responsibility or insurance
settlement, including the nature of the injury and all of the
involved parties. But rather than share that information with its
Medicare Advantage contractors, CMS instead only puts them on
notice of secondary payer situations by reducing its capitation rate.
36. Technically, any improper payment made by Medicare is considered
under federal law an "overpayment" and use of the term "lien" is incorrect. The
use here is demonstrative of use by practitioners.
37. See Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act (MMSEA) of 2007, 42
U.S.C. § 1395y (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (commonly referred to as Section 111).
14172015]
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The assumption is that if a primary payer exists, then the MAO is
not required to provide as many benefits and therefore its payment
should be reduced accordingly. But the question remains, if
Medicare Advantage is in fact supposed to be the same as Medicare,
then why does CMS not share sufficient data with its Medicare
Advantage contractors to help facilitate secondary payer recoveries?
Between MAOs not behaving like Medicare and CMS leaving
MAOs to fend for themselves, it is not hard to see why the
perception that Medicare Advantage is different from Medicare
exists. Unfortunately, that misunderstanding has filtered its way
into the judicial system. The resulting case law stems from either
bad legislation or a judicial attempt to read something into the
Medicare statute that just is not there. The next sections will
explore the situation.
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE SECONDARY PAYER PROVISIONS
A. Express Statutory Provisions as Provided by Congress
The Medicare Act has been described as "one of 'the most
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.'
3
1
Originally codified in 1965, the Medicare Act has been routinely
amended throughout the years, primarily through budget bills."
But several inconsistencies were created in the statute along the
way. None has proven more challenging than identifying the
reimbursement rights of Medicare Advantage plans.
Statutorily, MAOs only have the right to bill primary payers or
beneficiaries in receipt of insurance payments. The regulations
38. Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., 715 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Cooper Univ. Hosp. v. Sebelius, 636 F.3d 44, 45 (3d Cir. 2010)).
39. See, e.g., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
The Act instituted a 30-month period after the start of dialysis during which
Medicare is secondary for ESRD with respect to Medicare beneficiaries with group
health coverage. It also extended the time period during which CMS may seek
recovery of conditional Medicare payments from liable primary payers to three
years from the date when the service was rendered. It clarified that beneficiaries
are generally not liable for MSP overpayments unless Medicare issued payment
directly to the beneficiary. Finally, Medicare was permitted to recover from third-
party administrators of primary plans as long as the third-party administrator has
the ability to recover from the employer or group health plan and is either
employed by or under contract with the employer.
1418 [Vol. 41:4
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permit MAOs to "exercise the same rights to recover from a
primary plan, entity, or individual that the Secretary exercises
under the MSP regulations in subparts B through D of part 411 of
this chapter. ' The MSP states that the Secretary may make a
conditional payment, may waive reimbursement obligations when
in the best interest of the program, shall provide access to claim
information, and shall perform many other collection functions.
However, subrogation rights and the right to bring a private cause
of action in federal court to recover Medicare overpayments are
reserved for the United States.4'
So while an MAO cannot bring a private cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2) (B) (iii), the MSP contains a second private
cause of action provision under § 1395y(b) (3) (A), totally separate
from the rights reserved for the United States. It provides that
"[t] here is established a private cause of action for damages (which
shall be in an amount double the amount otherwise provided) in
the case of a primary plan which fails to provide for primary
payment (or appropriate reimbursement) in accordance with
paragraphs (1) and (2) (A)."" Paragraph (1) is titled "Requirements
of group health plans" and lays out several scenarios where group
health plans may not take eligibility for Medicare benefits into
consideration for purposes of denying benefits.43 Paragraph (2) (A)
establishes situations where Medicare is prohibited from making
payments due to the existence of other primary payment options,• 44
in which group health plans are expressly noted. Due to use of the
40. 42 C.F.R. § 422.108(f) (2014).
41. See Parra, 715 F.3d at 1154.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (3) (A) (2012) (emphasis added).
43. Id. § 1395y(b)(1) (A) (i). The paragraph states:
A group health plan-(I) may not take into account that an individual
(or the individual's spouse) who is covered under the plan by virtue of
the individual's current employment status with an employer is entitled
to benefits under this subchapter under section 426 (a) of this title,
and (II) shall provide that any individual age 65 or older (and the
spouse age 65 or older of any individual) who has current employment
status with an employer shall be entitled to the same benefits under the
plan under the same conditions as any such individual (or spouse)
under age 65.
Id.
44. Id. § 1395y(b) (2) (A). The paragraph states:
Payment under this subchapter may not be made, except as provided
in subparagraph (B), with respect to any item or service to the extent
14192015]
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conjunctive "and" and the reference to group health plans in each
condition, it would be easy to assume that this private cause of
action was intended to apply in situations in which a group health
plan refused to make payment due to Medicare eligibility causing
Medicare to pay. But that is not the case today.
While paragraph (2) (A) has non-group health plan (NGHP)
applications, paragraph (1) only applies to group health plans.
Therefore the intentional use of the conjunction "and" makes
applications of § 1395y(b) (3) (A) impossible in non-group health
situations if the statute is to be strictly construed. This result, while
implausible, may be explained by the fact that CMS did not turn its
attention to NGHP situations until the turn of the century. There
is no documented proof of congressional intent regarding
§ 1395y(b) (3) (A) in the congressional record, or anywhere else for
that matter. Unfortunately, this lack of evidence caused the courts
to resort to the Chevron analysis and adopt public policy arguments
aimed at preserving the Medicare program to reach conclusions in15
favor of MAOs. These conclusions essentially rewrite the MSP.
that-(i) payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be
made, with respect to the item or service as required under paragraph
(1), or (ii) payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to
be made under a workmen's compensation law or plan of the United
States or a State or under an automobile or liability insurance policy or
plan (including a self-insured plan) or under no fault insurance. In
this subsection, the term "primary plan" means a group health plan or
large group health plan, to the extent that clause (i) applies, and a
workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability
insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or no fault
insurance, to the extent that clause (ii) applies. An entity that engages
in a business, trade, or profession shall be deemed to have a self-
insured plan if it carries its own risk (whether by a failure to obtain
insurance, or otherwise) in whole or in part.
Id.
45. See Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (setting forth the legal test for determining whether a government
agency's interpretation of a statute which it administers should be granted
deference).
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B. Judicial Interpretations of MA O Rights
1. Strict Statutory Construction Originally Prevented MA Os from
Suing Under the MSP
Although there were a few reported earlier cases, the recovery
rights of MA~s truly came into question starting in January 2011,
when the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
dismissed a suit filed by Humana seeking recovery from a Medicare
beneficiary who settled a slip-and-fall claim against a condominium
association.46 The court found that, because the MSP only permits
the United States to bring a private cause of action, Humana lacked
standing to do so as MAOs possess only the 
rights of the Secretary.
4 7
Therefore, the court concluded that an MAO lacked standing to
pursue such a claim for recovery of Medicare payments in federal
48
court.
Shordy thereafter, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona provided some additional analysis in Parra v. Pacificare of
Arizona, Inc.4 :' In a wrongful death action involving a Medicare
Advantage enrollee, the court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that the statute
provided no private cause of action for MAOs and found no
congressional intent to infer such a right.5 ' Due to express statutory
and regulatory provisions regarding billing rights, the court found
46. Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v. Reale, No. 10-21493-Civ-COOKE/
BANDSTRA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8909, at *1 (S.D. Fla.Jan. 31, 2011).
47. See id. at *5 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2006); 42 C.F.R.
§ 422.108(f) (2010)).
48. Id. The court took this conclusion one step further, noting that "[e]ven if
this action had been brought under 1395mm(e)(4), however, a dismissal would
still be warranted because 1395mm(e)(4) does not confer a private right of
action." Id. at *5 n.2.
49. No. CV 10-008-TUC-DCB, 2011 WL 1119736, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28,
2011).
50. Id.
51. Id. at *3-5 ("The Magistrate Judge found that the Medicare statutes allow
PacifiCare to include subrogation and reimbursement rights in its agreement with
its members, 'but it did not create a federal right to enforce that contract.' This
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge .... The Court finds that the Medicare
statutes at issue, here, do no more than create a federal right. They stop short of
creating a federal private right of action to enforce that right and do not contain
any jurisdictional provision granting the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over
Medicare reimbursement claims.").
14212015]
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss4/4
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
that the proper place for MAO reimbursement claims lay in state
52court under contract theories.
Then the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled against Humana in its efforts to recover from
GlaxoSmithKline in the In re Avandia multidistrict litigation. 3
While Humana argued that § 1395y(b) (3) (A) unambiguously
granted a private cause of action to MAOs, the court found that it
did not. The court supported this conclusion in several steps.
First, it discussed the permissive versus mandatory language of the
statute.55 Next, the court performed the four-part test set forth in
Cort v. Ash5 6 to examine whether an implied right could be
57 58established. 5 The court even performed the two-part Chevron
analysis and found that "the silence of Congress regarding private
remedies does not create ambiguity, but rather indicates its intent
not to create a private right of action for MAOs, instead leaving
MAOs to enforce their rights as secondary payers under the
common law of contract.'
5
1
As it stood in 2011, the courts had established that MAOs
could not sue for recovery under the MSP and were instead
relegated to state court to pursue claims under a contract theory.60
CMS, however, did not care for those outcomes and, in December
2011, issued a memorandum to its Part C and Part D contractors
stating that "[n]otwithstanding these recent court decisions, CMS
maintains that the existing MSP regulations are legally valid and an
integral part of the Medicare Part C and D programs.' 61 But what is
52. Id. at *5.
53. In reAvandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1871,
Nos. 07-md-01871, 10-6733, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63544, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 13,
2011) (memorandum opinion and order regarding Humana v. GlaxoSmithKline),
rev'd, 685 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013).
54. In re Avandia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63544, at *8.
55. Id. at *10-14.
56. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
57. In reAvandia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63544, at *15.
58. Chevron, U.S., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
59. In re Avandia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63544, at *20.
60. See id. at *8; Parra v. PacifiCare of Ariz., Inc., No. CV 10-008-TUC-DCB,
2011 WL 1119736, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2011); Humana Med. Plan, Inc. v.
Reale, No. 10-21493-Civ-COOKE/BANDSTRA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8909, at *5
(S.D. Fla.Jan. 31, 2011).
61. Memorandum from Danielle R. Moon, Dir., Medicare Drug & Health
Plan Contract Admin. Grp., & Cynthia Tudor, Dir., Medicare Dng Benefit & C&D
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interesting about its interpretation of the regulations is that CMS
states that 42 C.F.R. § 422.108 is an assignment of the rights and
responsibilities to collect for Medicare services for which Medicare
is not the primary payer. 62 If CMS is saying that Medicare is
prohibited from making payments in secondary payer situations
and MAOs are required to seek reimbursement just as the Secretary
would be, then why the permissive statutory language?
2. Liberal Interpretation by the Third Circuit Broadened MAO
Rights
Starting in 2012, the story went awry and courts began allowing
more and more broad interpretations of who the private cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (3) (A) was intended for. In June
of 2012, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district
court's decision in the In re Avandia case, finding that the
"language of the MSP private cause of action is broad and
unrestricted and therefore allows any private plaintiff with standing
to bring an action."63 Rather than be persuaded by the fact that
there is no record of congressional intent, the court instead relied
on the absence of congressional intent to deny MAOs access to the
MSP private cause of action. CA The court used unrelated
information in the Federal Register concerning changes to the
Beneficiary Rebate Rule to infer that MAOs required the right to
file private causes of action to "faithfully pursue and recover from
liable third parties. ' '65 Only through these actions, the court
concluded, could MAOs lower medical expenses so that rebates go
up and enrollees receive more non-Medicare benefits funded by
those rebates. In reality, these same savings could be achieved
Data Grp., to Medicare Advantage Orgs. & Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors
(Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.pmsionline.com/pdf/CMS%20Memo
-%20MAOs -%2012-05-11.pdf. While MAOs have "the same rights . . . [as] the
Secretary . .. under the Original Medicare MSP regulations," Prescription Drug
Plans (PDPs) have all the same rights as MAOs, and therefore all of these same
issues exist for PDPs as well. Id.
62. Id.
63. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d 353,
367 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013).
64. Id. at 361.
65. Id. at 363, 363 n.17 (citing policy and technical changes to the Medicare
Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefits Program, 74 Fed. Reg.
54,634, 54,711 (proposed Oct. 22, 2009)).
66. Id.
14232015]
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through diligent coordination of benefits and pursuit of recoveries
rather than costly litigation.
Therefore, it is unclear as to how the court jumped to the
conclusion that a private cause of action is necessary from the text
provided. While it is feasible to agree with the court that "nothing
in the text or legislative history of the statute . . . impl[ies] that
Congress did not intend to facilitate recovery for MAOs in the same
fashion" 67 as traditional Medicare, there is also nothing that does
demonstrate such intent. In fact, there is no support for the
contention that Congress, at the time the legislation was written,
even remotely considered an MAO's ability to sue in federal court
for recovery in secondary payer situations.
Springboarding off of this success, Humana filed four separate
cases in different circuits almost simultaneously, possibly in an• • • 68
attempt to see where each circuit would stand on the issue. All of
the cases were filed against Farmers Insurance (Farmers), or a
subsidiary thereof, likely due to its unilateral adoption of the
position that MAOs do not have any right under federal law to
recover from insurance companies like Farmers. Nor did Farmers
believe that MAOs had a right to bring a private cause of action for
double damages, or that, in these cases, the MAO complied with
the Medicare Act's requirements for making a "conditional
payment" which would trigger its reimbursement rights under the
MSP. 69 All but one case was voluntarily withdrawn, and, in February
2014, a magistrate judge for the U.S. District Court for the Western
67. Id. at 364.
68. Humana Health Plan, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. 13-2367 (D. Kan. filed
July 22, 2013); Humana Ins. Co. v. Farmers Texas Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No.
13-00611-LY (E.D. Tex. filed July 22, 2013); Humana Health Plan, Inc. v. Farmers
Ins. Co., No. 13-730 (W.D. Mo. filed July 22, 2013); Cariten Health Plan v. Mid-
Century Ins. Co., No. 13-00417 (E.D. Tex. filedJuly 17, 2013).
69. See, e.g., Humana Health Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., A-13-CA-611 LY,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167143, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014). Farmers contends
that a proper conditional payment requires that Humana investigate and
determine whether the primary plan "cannot reasonably be expected to make
payment," whereas it paid without any investigation. Id. at *15 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b)(2)(B) (2012)). However, 42 C.F.R. § 411.21 (2014) defines a
conditional payment as "a Medicare payment for services for which another payer
is responsible, made either on the bases set forth in subparts C through H of this
part, or because the intermediary or carrier did not know that the other coverage
existed." See also Humana Health Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167143, at *16
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 411.21 (2014)). Therefore, Humana's payments were made
conditionally despite the lack of knowledge of the primary plan. Id. at *16.
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District of Texas noted that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
precedent was not binding.7" This allowed the judge to thoroughly
review the record and legal claims as a matter of first impression for
the Fifth Circuit.7'
In his recommendation to the district court, the magistrate
judge noted that "nothing in the [Medicare] statute specifically
grants an MAO a private cause of action to recover against a
primary payer" and that "if Congress intended for MAOs to recover
payments . . . via a federal cause of action, it could have
incorporated the private right of action into the [Medicare]
statute.',72 The magistrate judge also noted that "different language
is used in setting forth the two structures" for recovery of
conditional payments.73 "[A]n MAO is permitted to, that is 'may,'
charge a primary payer," while "a primary payer is required to, that
is 'shall,' reimburse Medicare for a conditional payment.
' '7
' This
gives MAOs the right to bill but mandates that primary payers make
reimbursement to Medicare. Under Fifth Circuit precedent,
5 the
magistrate judge concluded that variation from mandatory to
permissive language is a "fairly clear indication that Congress
intended the Medicare program to have more extensive rights"
than its private sector counterparts. 76 Lastly, the magistrate judge,
citing a House report, explained that the Medicare Advantage
program was intended to "harness the power of private sector
competition to stimulate experimentation 
and innovation.,
77
70. Humana Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co., No. A-13-CA-611 LY, 2014 WL
8388619, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2014) (order on report and
recommendation).
71. Ultimately, the presiding judge did not follow the magistrate's
recommendation and followed the Third Circuit's conclusions. See id. at *2.
72. See id. at *13 (quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404
(1991) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusions.")).
73. See id. at *13-14.
74. Id. at *13 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-22(a) (4), 1395y(b) (2) (B) (ii)).
75. Id. at *14 ("[W]hen Congress uses different terms, each term [is] to have
a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning." (quoting Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d
197, 203 (5th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. Id. at *14 n.5 (quoting Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786,
790 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at *15 (quoting In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 685 F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013)).
14252015]
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Therefore, creating something that occupied the same space as
traditional Medicare would not be innovative.78 "IT]he fact that a
federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not
automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that
person," 79 "no matter how desirable that might be as a policy
matter, or how compatible with the statute.""" The magistrate
recommended that the court dismiss all of Humana's claims;'
however, in September 2014, the district court issued its order on
the report and recommendation, siding with the Third Circuit and
82rejecting the magistrate judge's recommendation.
3. Disguising Suits as State Law Claims Not Sufficient to Subvert
MAO Recoveries
The remaining private cause of action cases reported in 2014
involved beneficiaries suing their MAOs in an attempt to avoid
reimbursement. In Einhorn v. Careplus Heath Plans, Inc., 3 the
plaintiff attempted to cleverly disguise her MSP issues as violations
of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, 4 claiming her
MAO was attempting to "collect on debts .. . not owed and/or by
,,815misrepresenting the amount due. The court determined that the
MSP was fundamentally at issue here because "seeking
compensation for actions that violated the Florida consumer
protection laws . . . [is] an untimely collateral attack on CarePlus'
determination of the amount of its lien tunder the Medicare
statutes. 8 6 Since the plaintiffs claims arose under the Medicare
78. Id. ("Occupying the same position as Medicare is not, on its face,
innovation. Nor is the mere fact that an MAO would benefit from a private right of
action a sufficient basis for concluding one exists." (citing California v. Sierra
Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981))).
79. Id. at *16 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568
(1979)).
80. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)).
81. Id. at *20.
82. Id. at *3-4
83. No. 14-61135-C1V, 2014 WL 4385912, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2014).
84. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 559.55-.785 (West, Westlaw through ch. 255 (end) of
2014 2d Reg. Sess. and Sp. "A" Sess. of 23d Leg.).
85. Einhorn, 2014 WL 4385912, at *1.
86. Id. at *2 (citing Bodimetric Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 903
F.2d 480, 487 (7th Cir. 1990)) ("A party cannot avoid the Medicare Act's
jurisdictional bar simply by styling its attack as a claim for collateral damages
instead of a challenge to the underlying denial of benefits. If litigants who have
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Act, she was required to exhaust the administrative remedy
provided therein before turning to the federal courts."' The
plaintiff had not exhausted these administrative processes, so her
claim was dismissed .
Similarly, in Collins v. Wellcare Healthcare Plans, the plaintiff
alleged her claims did not arise under the Medicare Act because
she brought only state law claims under her "contract" with
Wellcare and did "not seek any Medicare benefits or services.""
Furthermore, she argued that Wellcare was not entitled to
subrogation because the right was not articulated in her contract
and that Wellcare "does not have a private right of action under the
MSP because ... [Collins was not] a group health plan."90 As in
Einhorn, the court found that a private cause of action did exist
tunder the MSP and that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies, ultimately dismissing her claims.9 ' Notably,
however, this court did not find that Wellcare had a right to double
damages in this instance.92 The statute states that "a primary plan
must fail to provide reimbursement"; therefore, the punitive effect
is intended for those "who intentionally withhold payment."' The
plaintiff placed funds in escrow upon receipt pending the outcome
of this litigation, therefore clearly not refusing payment.94
been denied benefits could routinely obtain judicial review of these decisions by
recharacterizing their claims under state and federal causes of action, the
Medicare Act's goal of limited judicial review for a substantial number of claims
would be severely limited.").
87. Id. at *2-3.
88. Id. ("Subsection 405(h) prevents beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries
from evading administrative review by creatively styling their benefits and
eligibility claims as constitutional or statutory challenges to Medicare statutes and
regulations." (quoting United States v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 156 F.3d
1098, 1104 (11th Cir. 1998))).
89. No. 13-6759, 2014 WL 7239426, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 16, 2014).
90. Id.
91. Id. at *5-7.
92. Id. at *16.
93. Id. at *15 ("Failure connotes an active dereliction of a duty, and the
award of double damages is intended to have a punitive effect on plans who
intentionally withhold payment.").
94. See id. at *16. ("A failure to provide reimbursement does not describe the
situation in the instant case, and the intended punitive remedy of double damages
is therefore not appropriate. Collins' duty to reimburse Wellcare only arose once
she received her tort settlement, and when this occurred, Collins placed the
money claimed by Wellcare into a trust. Collins therefore did not conceal the
14272015]
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C. Other Applications of 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A)
At this point it is evident that the federal courts have fully
adopted the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of the MSP in
favor of Medicare Advantage plans, despite the express statutory
language to the contrary. But the debate as to who may bring a
private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (3) (A) is not
limited to Medicare Advantage cases. In fact, MAOs originally
attempted to use 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2) (B) (iii), assuming that
they sat in the Secretary's shoes. It was not until the district court in. . 95
In re Avandia emphasized this and other possibilities that a
noticeable increase of cases arose under § 1395y(b) (3) (A).
Unfortunately, the possible use of § 1395y(b) (3) (A) by MAOs
suffers from the district courts' application of Chevron deference,
since there is no known record of express congressional intent
regarding § 1395y(b) (3) (A). In practice, then, this permits the
active application of a policy built on the overwhelming sentiment
to protect the Medicare program and results in absurdities that
Congress could not have intended.
1. Standing Imperative
Once CMS started drawing attention to the MSP in 2001, many
tried to profit from the private cause of action in § 1395y(b) (3) (A).
In 2004, a workers' compensation claimant sued her carrier, on
behalf of all similarly situated claimants, because she did not
receive a Medicare set-aside 96 when she settled her claim in what
she perceived was a violation of the MSP.97 Regardless of the fact
that she did not allege that she was a Medicare beneficiary or ever
would be, she failed to demonstrate any actual damages as
Medicare had made no payments and the MSP is a recoupment
money or spend the money ... ").
95. In reAvandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1871,
Nos. 07-md-01871, 10-6733, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63544 (E.D. Pa.June 13, 2011),
rev'd, 685 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013).
96. A "set-aside" is money specifically earmarked, but not physically
restricted, at the time of settlement intended for payment of future medical
expenses related to the insurance settlement that otherwise would have been paid
for by Medicare. See Warkers' Compensation Medicare Set Aside Arrangements, CENTERS
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coordination
-of-Benefits/Workers-Compensation-Medicare-Set-Aside-Arrangements/WCMSAP
-Overview.html (last modified Apr. 18, 2013, 9:01 AM).
97. Frazer v. CNA Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 2d. 1067, 1075-76 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
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provision and totally ineffective for claiming future inchoate
damages. Therefore, the case was dismissed for lack of standing.9
2. Demonstration of Responsibility Is Not Necessary
In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
dismissal of a claim attempting to recover from certain tobacco
manufacturers the cost of health care services attributable to
cigarette smoking that were paid by Medicare. 99 Rather than argue
standing, given that the MSP is not a qui tam statute, the defendants
argued for dismissal based on collateral estoppel or the ground
that the claim was duplicative of claims brought by the United
States in another court. 0 0 Additionally, the defendants moved for
dismissal on the ground of failure to state a claim because the
defendants' responsibility for payment had not been established.''
While the court did not agree with the defendants' first two
arguments, it was not persuaded by the plaintiff's argument that
responsibility for primary payment could be established by
litigating the state tort claim during the MSP action. °2 The court
thus found that one could not fail to make payment when
responsibility has not been established.'0I In addition, the court
said that its conclusion was supported by the fact that such a
decision would drastically expand federal jurisdiction by creating a
forum to litigate any state tort claim without regard to diversity or
amount in controversy, and that this would contravene class action
requirements. 104
Despite not being a qui tam statute, several suits were also filed
by Douglas Stalley, a known associate of Erin Brokovich, famous for
her class action claims against Pacific Gas and Electric. All of these
suits were dismissed for lack of standing and Mr. Stalley was
98. Id. at 1078-83.
99. Gloverv. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2006).
100. Id. at 1307.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1309 ("When Plaintiffs filed their MSP claim, Defendants'
responsibility to pay for items or services had not yet been 'demonstrated,' which
is a condition precedent to Defendants' obligation to reimburse Medicare under
section 1395y(b) (2) (B) (ii). Until Defendants' responsibility to pay for a Medicare
beneficiary's expenses has been demonstrated . . . Defendants' obligation to
reimburse Medicare does not exist under the relevant provisions.").
103. Id.
104. See id.
14292015]
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sanctioned in 2008 for his frivolous waste of judicial resources.'" In
Wood v. Empire Health Choice, the plaintiff nearly achieved standing
by alleging injury as a taxpayer; however, the court ultimately found
his injury "too generalized and attenuated" to constitute personal
injury.' 6 In fact, only one reported opinion during this period
actually proceeded to the merits. O'Connor v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore involved a plaintiff denied benefits under workers'
compensation, which caused Medicare to pay despite orders by the
Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission."°7 The plaintiff
achieved standing because he filed as a Medicare beneficiary suing
on behalf of himself as a workers' compensation claimant
wrongfully denied state benefits, which caused Medicare to make
payments, rather than on behalf of Medicare."' The court felt that
the rights under the statute were intended to be vindicated by
involved citizens with knowledge of the debt.0 9
The next case addressing the scope of § 1395y(b) (3) (A) was
Bio-Medical Applications of Tennessee, Inc. v. Central States Southeast &
Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund in 2011."0 Like O'Connor,1"
this suit was one of the few initiated by a Medicare beneficiary
denied medical benefits due to Medicare entitlement. In this case,
an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) group
health plan denied benefits on the basis of the patient's eligibility
for Medicare due to end-stage renal disease, causing Medicare to
make payments."' Bio-Medical's motion for summary judgment on
the ERISA claim was granted; however, Bio-Medical's MSP claim for
105. See, e.g., Stalley v. Mountain States Health Alliance, 644 F.3d 349 (6th Cir.
2011); Stalley v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., Civil No. 06-2492, 2007 WL 781907, at
*1-2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2007). For a listing of other cases brought by Mr. Stalley
around the same time, see Stalley v. Ameris Health System, No. 3:07CV00006 GTE,
2008 WL 239662, at *1 (E.D. Ark.Jan. 28, 2008).
106. Woods v. Empire Health Choice, 574 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2009) ("[T]he
complaint asserts only that the Government has suffered substantial pecuniary
injury as a result of Empire's actions, depriving taxpayers of savings to which they
are rightfully entitled. The alleged injury suffered by the Government, however,
was not inflicted on Woods.").
107. O'Connor v. Mayor & City Council of Bait., 494 F. Supp. 2d. 372, 373 (D.
Md. 2007). Note that this court did not even question claimant's standing in a
non-group health situation despite the express terms of the legislation.
108. Id. at 374.
109. See id.
110. 656 F.3d 277 (6th Cir. 2011).
111. 494 F. Supp. 2d. 372.
112. See Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc., 656 F.3d at 280.
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double damages was dismissed on the basis that Bio-Medical failed
to demonstrate that Central States bore responsibility for113
payment. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that "the 'demonstrated responsibility' provision limits only lawsuits
against tortfeasors, not lawsuits against private insurers.
The phrase "demonstrated responsibility" is found in the
United States' private cause of action found at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b) (2) (B) (iii), whereas Bio-Medical used the private cause
of action found at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (3) (A), which only requires
that the primary payer fail to pay. The court was particularly
persuaded by a regulatory change adopted in 2006 which clarified
that the demonstration of liability could be accomplished with a
settlement, judgment, or other means, such as an insurance
contract, indicating tort situations."1
5
The thorough legal analysis of § 1395y(b) (3) (A) found in the
Bio-Medical case was truly the first of its kind. The court questioned
when a primary plan fails to make payment in accordance with
both conditions and looked at each in great detail. Satisfying
paragraph (1) was easy in the case because the ERISA plan
expressly required participants to enroll in Medicare immediately
upon attaining eligibility. Denying the patient coverage because
of her eligibility for Medicare was the kind of act the statute
expressly intended to prevent.'17 Paragraph (2) (a) however, proved
to be more of a challenge as the provision is directed at Medicare,
instructing it not to pay when there is another available primary
payer. Because a primary plan cannot violate an order addressed
113. Id. at 281. Although Bio-Medical is actually the provider, it filed suit on
behalf of the Medicare beneficiary through assignment of her rights. Id. at 280-81.
114. Id. at 291.
115. See id. ("This interpretation is now fully supported by a federal regulation
adopted in February 2006 .... This regulation interprets the ambiguous statutory
phrase 'other means' and is reasonable because it implicitly acknowledges that
while a tortfeasor's responsibility must be determined ex post, the nature of
insurance is the assumption of responsibility ex ante." (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006))). For a copy of the regulation referred to in the
decision, see Medicare Program; Medicare Secondary Payer Amendments, 71 Fed.
Reg. 9466 (Feb. 24, 2006) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 411.22 (2014)). The clarification
provided via the new regulation was introduced to prevent clever attorneys from
not making a claim for medical damages or engaging in other legal maneuvers to
avoid triggering the MSP.
116. Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc., 656 F.3d at 285.
117. See id. at 284-86.
118. Id. at 285-86; 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2) (a) (2012).
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to Medicare, it is impossible to meet both conditions of this private
cause of action." 9 To avoid this legal gridlock, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals suggested that the paragraphs be read separately
rather than together.12 This permitted the important conclusion
that "a primary plan fails to pay 'in accordance with paragraphs (1)
and (2) (A)' when it terminates a plan holder's coverage and
thereby induces Medicare to make a conditional payment on its
behalf."'
121
3. Compensability Under State Law Is Necessary
Following Bio-Medical, there began to be a more limited
application of the private cause of action provision under
§ 1395y(b) (3) (A). In Caldera v. Insurance Company of the State of
Pennsylvania,122  a Medicare beneficiary sued his workers'
compensation carrier for reimbursement of Medicare payments
made between 2002, when his Texas compensation claim was
administratively closed, and 2009, when an agreed judgment was
entered in which his benefits were reinstated and the carrier
stipulated that all medical treatment received to date related back
to the claimant's original date of loss. 12 While the insurer
compensated the beneficiary for all missed indemnity payments,
the carrier refused to reimburse any medical expenses.121
According to the carrier, the claimant failed to obtain proper
authorization from the carrier pursuant to Texas law at the time
the services were rendered. 25 The courts at all levels agreed that
the carrier was not responsible under state workers' compensation
law, even though Medicare was entitled to reimbursement under
the pure spirit of the MSP.
12 6
119. Bio-Med. Applications of Tenn., Inc., 656 F.3d at 286.
120. See id. (citing United States v. At. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137
(2008) (concluding that statutes should not be interpreted so as to "render [an]
entire provision a nullity")).
121. Id.
122. 716 F.3d 861 (5th Cir. 2013).
123. Caldera v. Ins. Co. of Pa., No. G11-321, 2012 WL 360183, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 2, 2012), affd on other grounds, 716 F.3d 861, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 436 (2013).
Texas workers' compensation law provides for lifetime medical benefits that
cannot be permanently closed. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.021 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 3d called Sess. of the 83d Legis.).
124. Caldera, 716 F.3d at 863.
125. See id. at 862-63.
126. See id. at 864-65 ("The MSP and its implementing regulations do not,
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Caldera is a glaring example of how the misunderstanding of
the MSP is rampant in the federal court system. This was a model
case for which Congress likely intended individuals to bring a
private cause of action-a Medicare beneficiary sought
reimbursement from his workers' compensation carrier who
questionably terminated his benefits, the carrier then later reversed
its decision, causing Medicare to make payments in the interim."'
The parties' actions prior to the agreed judgment should have
been irrelevant for purposes of the MSP as the MSP was not even
triggered until the agreed judgment was entered. 12 Thus, the focus
on federal preemption was misplaced. At the time the services were
129
rendered, Medicare was Caldera's primary payer and it was not
until the agreed judgment that the MSP came into play. Despite
acceptance by the defendant that the injury was compensable, it
did not agree to pay past medical damages. And because it was
not conceded to in the settlement agreement, the carrier's liability
for payment was determined purely on the basis of workers'
compensation law.' While the significance of the agreed judgment
in the context of the MSP should have at least been discussed,
Caldera does represent good precedent that Medicare recovery
rights are limited by the underlying state 
law. 1 2
however, extend so far as to eviscerate all state-law limitations on payment .... To
the contrary, the plain language of the MSP illustrates its harmonious relationship
with state workers' compensation law: a workers' compensation carrier is 'primary'
only if 'payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made under a
workmen's compensation law or plan of the United States or a State."'). Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit concluded, "Medicare generally 'does not pay until the beneficiary
has exhausted his or her remedies under workers' compensation."' Id. The
Supreme Court denied Caldera's petition for certiorari on October 15, 2013. See
Caldera, 134 S. Ct. 436.
127. Caldera, 716 F.3d at 862-63.
128. See Caldera, 2012 WL 360183, at *1 ("On April 12, 2011, the parties
entered into an Agreed Judgment in state court holding that the condition
requiring back surgery was, in fact, related to the initial 1995 workers
compensation injury." (citation omitted)).
129. Although a moot point, recall that at the time of the services, the
claimant was denied workers' compensation benefits. See id. Therefore, intuitively,
the question remains why he would have sought authorization.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id.
132. See Caldera, 716 F.3d at 867.
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4. Race to File for Double Damages
But what happens when one takes Bio-Medica's lack of
demonstrated liability and uses it in conjunction with In re
Avandia's liberal interpretation of standing under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b) (3) (A)? The answer is found in Michigan Spine & Brain
Surgeons, PLLC v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 133 In the
most convoluted of all MSP applications, the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan originally granted standing to a
medical provider that had already billed and accepted a
conditional payment from Medicare and therefore had no
damages. 134 The claim stemmed from an auto accident with
coverage denied on the basis of the beneficiary's preexisting
condition. 3 5 Upon denial of payment, the provider made the
election to accept a conditional payment from Medicare and then
sued the auto insurer, State Farm, for double its original bill.
136
Following Bio-Medical, the court found that the provider did not
need to prove State Farm's liability for the payments, only that it
did not make them, and the court granted the provider standing to
pursue a claim under the MSP. On reconsideration, the court
dismissed the MSP claim as further statutory analysis found that the
private cause of action could only be brought against a group
health plan due to the use of the conjunctive "and" in the statute.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals again reversed and granted
Michigan Spine & Brain Surgeons standing to pursue
133. 758 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2014).
134. Mich. Spine & Brain Surgeons, PLLC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
No. 12-CV-11329, 2013 WL 501632, at *4-6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2013), on
reconsideration, No. 12-11329, 2013 WL 5435284 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2013), rev'd,
758 F.3d 787. The provider had no damages here because it made the decision to
bill Medicare and accept payment at the lower Medicare rate. Mich. Spine & Brain
Surgeons, PLLC, 758 F.3d at 789. In order to bill Medicare for a conditional
payment, a provider must first bill the primary payer. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395y(b) (2) (B) (i) (2012). Once it is determined that timely payment will not be
forthcoming, the provider may elect to accept a conditional payment from
Medicare and give up any rights against the primary payer or to balance bill for
the amount in excess of the Medicare fee schedule. The provider is not obligated
to do so and may instead assert a traditional lien against any insurance proceeds.
135. Mich. Spine & Brain Surgeons, PLLC, 2013 WL 501632, at * 1.
136. Id. at * 1-3.
137. Id. at *5-6.
138. Mich. Spine & Brain Surgeons, PLLC, 2013 WL 5435284, at *1, *3-4.
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reimbursement under the MSP.'39 The court found Bio-Medical
distinguishable as it did not address non-group health plans, as was
the case here, and instead turned to Chevron deference.140 The
court looked at numerous regulations all addressing group health
plans and inferred that the paragraph (1) requirement only
applied to group health plans and that non-group health plans only
needed to satisfy paragraph (2) (a) .14 Any other interpretation
"would eviscerate the private cause of action as it relate [d] to non-
group health plans.""Z The court also relied upon dicta taken from
In re Avandia about how Congress intended to "curb skyrocketing
health costs and preserve the fiscal integrity of the Medicare
system" to conclude that this was Congress's plan all along.
4
1 As
noted above, evidence of this congressional intent does not exist in
the legislative history or congressional records. In the end, we are
left with precedent that a medical service provider, who had already
been paid, can then sue on behalf of Medicare for double damages
without any need to prove that the defendant was even responsible
for the payment.
Finally, we reach the apex of absurd. Estate of Clinton McDonald
v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America involved Medicare
reimbursements that were agreed to during a workers'
compensation dispute but remained unpaid following resolution of
that issue. 1 41 Claimant's estate filed suit under the MSP after the
defendant contacted CMS to obtain the amount owed but before
the agency's response. 14  The conditional payments were
immediately resolved once demand was made; however, the court
still awarded the estate its full share of the double damages. 146 The
court found that the estate's suit compelled the insurer to pay
Medicare as the statute intended and, as such, it was still entitled to
its bounty.17 The court stated that "[oince a private cause of action
claim has been lodged against a defendant, a defendant cannot
139. Mich. Spine &Brain Surgeons, PLLC, 758 F.3d at 793.
140. Id. at 792-93.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 793.
143. Id. (quoting In reAvandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685
F.3d 353, 363 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013)).
144. No. 3:12-CV-577, 2014 WL 4365209, at *5 (D. Ky. Sept. 2, 2014).
145. See id. at *1-2.
146. Id. at *5.
147. Id.
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escape the double damages provided for in that provision by paying
single damages to Medicare.,
48
For those who have never attempted to resolve a Medicare
conditional payment obligation, the absurdity of this outcome may
be lost. Although some procedural improvements have been made
by CMS, the procedures that applied when this case was developing
are likely to blame for this outcome. At that time, an insurer had to
request a conditional payment search be conducted by a certain
CMS contractor, the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery
Contractor (MSPRC). Unfortunately, had the insurer not first
opened a case file with the Coordination of Benefits Contractor
(COBC), requested said information from any other CMS affiliate,
or failed to submit the proper release signed by the Medicare
beneficiary, the request would have been ignored without notice.
Had the request been successful, the insurer very likely would have
received a laundry list of every medical service performed since the
date of loss at a minimum of forty-five days later but generally more
like sixty to ninety days later. Even if the insurer successfully argued
what items were unrelated and they were removed, the letters
would continue to arrive with new additions until a demand letter
was finally issued; however, a final demand would not be issued
until the settlement was finalized as the MSP is not actually
triggered until settlement, judgment, award, or other payment,
even though it would be very helpful to know what is owed prior to
that moment. If the insurer sent a payment to the government
prior to a demand, that check would have been cashed but the
insurer's reimbursement obligations not necessarily credited. And
if the insurer happened to tender the funds to the Medicare
beneficiary in hopes that they would find their way to Medicare and
they did not, then under 42 C.F.R. § 411.26, the insurer may just
have to satisfy that reimbursement obligation again. "' So it is
ridiculous for a federal court to penalize an insurer-defendant to
the tune of $184,514.24 15 for not being able to satisfy the
reimbursement obligations before the plaintiff, knowledgeable of
the defendant's efforts, is able to run to the courthouse and file
suit.
148. Id.
149. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.26 (2014).
150. See Estate of McDonald, 2014 WL 4365209, at *1.
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IV. PURSUING CLARIFICATION
A. Courts Must Understand CMS Practices and Policies to Make
Informed Rulings
Right or wrong, this precedent is controlling, and so long as
the MSP is being interpreted to the advantage of the Medicare
program, there is little hope of congressional intervention to clean
up the inconsistencies in the statute. Due to this lack of clarity and
because the courts' conclusions support the strong public policy of
preserving the Medicare program, the opinions are wrong per se.
However, the problem is that it is not proper for the courts to
legislate from the bench and that is exactly what they are currently
doing. The statute clearly states that MAOs may bill for
reimbursement,' 5' yet the courts are finding congressional intent
for much greater reimbursement rights despite the lack of tangible
proof. Whether Congress purposefully did not grant an express
private cause of action for MAOs or it was merely an oversight, the
fact of the matter is that the express statutory language and lack of
proof of congressional intent both point to the fact that the Third
Circuit precedent is overreaching. Of course MAOs would want the
same recovery rights as traditional Medicare, but if Congress did
not provide them, then it is not for the courts to grant them.
The best hope for resolution of this issue will have to come
from the Supreme Court. For it to reach that stage, there will need
to be more conflict among the circuits. Unfortunately, that is no
easy feat. The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to take
up an MSP case, having denied both cases that petitioned for
certiorari in recent years.15 The first involved a challenge to the
amount of reimbursement owed, as CMS refused to compromise
and the reimbursement nearly exhausted the entire settlement
amount, leaving the beneficiary with next to nothing. The second
was the In re Avandia case referenced above."53 Unfortunately, due
to the fact that administrative procedures must be exhausted, it
takes a very long time to get to court. While the process varies
slightly for Medicare Advantage, its appeals process merges with
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(a) (4) (2012).
152. See Caldera v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 716 F.3d 861 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 436 (2013); In reAvandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 685 F.3d
353 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1800 (2013).
153. See In re Avandia, 685 F.3d 353.
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traditional Medicare in adjudication before an administrative law
judge, for which there is currently a seven-year backlog of cases.
Therefore, it could be a decade before today's Medicare Advantage
issues will be heard before a court and be in the pipeline nearing
the judicial review stage.
To create the needed conflict, the cases will have to articulate
why the Third Circuit decision is misinformed and overreaching.
One of the primary reasons that the courts reach such conclusions
is their lack of personal expertise in dealing with the Medicare
program. Interpreting Medicare statutes and regulations in a
vacuum is idealistic when the realities of the government
bureaucracy are unknown. It is impossible to hold someone
accountable for violating the statute or regulation when it is the
agency that caused the delay or frustrated the process. But that is
exactly what the courts are being asked to do.
Take, for example, Estate of Clinton McDonald v. Indemnity
Insurance Co. of North America, referenced above. 154 While there is
nothing wrong with the court's strict interpretation of the MSP
permitting double damages, the fact of matter was that the plaintiff
took advantage of the situation by filing suit in the middle of the
process with CMS. It was not as if the defendant was not trying to
resolve the issue and reimbursement was made as soon as demand
was received, but the court still awarded the estate double
damages. 55 The court concluded that it was the suit that compelled
payment and also that double damages cannot be avoided after suit
is filed by only paying single damages to Medicare. 5' But for the
CMS process being so convoluted and time consuming, the
defendant could likely have resolved the issue long before the
private cause of action was filed and no such damages would have
been owed. So one can only conclude that the plaintiff filed purely
to profit and not to obtain reimbursement for Medicare, as that
process was already underway at the time of filing. The amount of
$184,514.24 is certainly punitive, but perhaps an award of
attorney's fees may have been more appropriate.
154. 2014 WL 4365209.
155. Id. at *5.
156. Id.
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B. Courts Must Understand What MAOs Are and How They Operate
Before Assuming Congressional Intent
1. MAOs Offer the Same Benefits but Operate Very Differently and
Totally Independently of CMS
With regard to MAOs, to affect better outcomes, the courts
need a better understanding of the MAOs' relationship with CMS
before assuming that Congress intended them to operate the same
as traditional Medicare. MAOs operate somewhat autonomously of
the federal government. While CMS does not provide any direct
Medicare benefits and even contracts out its fee-for-service
traditional Part A and B benefits, it maintains a certain amount of
oversight. On a day-to-day basis, the federal government has no
actual knowledge of benefits provided by the MAOs. The MAOs
and the government do not regularly share claim data. If an insurer
requests conditional payment information from the government
and it turns out the beneficiary is enrolled in a Medicare Advantage
plan, the results will be zero, even if benefits were paid by the
MAO. If an enrollee has a problem with a benefit determination,
he must first seek reconsideration from the MAO before he enters
the Medicare appeal process. Even the Third Circuit noted the
distinction between the permissive language used when
establishing rules for the independent MAOs compared to the
mandatory language used when creating rules for the Secretary,
over whom Congress exercises control• With so many differences
in the infrastructure of the two delivery models, there is little
justification for the courts to arrive at the conclusion that Congress
intended them to both have the same recovery rights.
2. Recovery Practices Can Never Be the Same, as MAOs Do Not
Have Access to Other Federal Agencies
One of the most telling facts suggesting that the courts'
assumptions are misguided is that the MAO recoveries are not
subject to federal debt collection laws. Any payment made by
Medicare in contravention to the MSP is by definition an
overpayment, and no different from any other payment made by
the U.S. government that should not have been made. While the
MSP contains some very specific recovery rights, at all times they
157. In re Avandia, 685 F.3d at 361.
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are overpayments subject to standard federal debt recovery laws. If
a conditional payment reimbursement demand by CMS goes
unanswered for 180 days, it must be referred to the Department of
Treasury pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of
1996.158 If Treasury is unsuccessful in obtaining reimbursement, the
claim is referred back to CMS or to the Department of Justice if it
believes that litigation under the MSP would be successful in
recovering the debt.
1 59
In contrast, MAOs are responsible for their own debt
collections, as they do not have access to the Departments of
Treasury or Justice. In practice, most MAOs utilize ordinary
collection agencies allegedly specializing in health care
recoveries.' 6° And like most collection agencies, they are
unrelenting in their demands for payment with little regard to the
legalities that give rise to the claim. They send generic letters
seeking claim data that someone seeking reimbursement would
have, making it obvious that the MAO has not been given sufficient
information by CMS about the injury or illness subject to secondary
payer provisions. The letters also generally cite a number of
statutory and regulatory provisions that look intimidating; however
many do not even apply to the situation.
To make matters worse, some MAOs have taken a recovery
position that exceeds that of the federal government. Aetna, for
example, includes a provision in its evidence of coverage stating
that it shall be entitled to full reimbursement on a first-dollar basis
from any payments, regardless of the effect on the beneficiary, and
that the plan is not required to participate in or pay any costs or
attorney's fees incurred in pursuit of the recovery. Even if
Medicare proper is entitled to full reimbursement regardless of any
other facts, CMS is required to reduce Medicare recoveries by
procurement costs. 1 6 2 How can an MAO contractually establish an
158. See 31 U.S.C. § 3711(g)(1)(A) (2012). Smaller debts are referred to
private collection agencies pursuant to § 3718.
159. See id. § 37 11(g) (4) (A), (C).
160. See, e.g., Will Shapiro, Rawling Medicare Advantage Memo, SHAPIRO
SETTLEMENT SOLUTIONS (Jan. 8, 2013), http://willshapiro.com/2013/01/08
/rawlings-medicare-advantage-memo/.
161. AETNA, 2015 EVIDENCE OF COVERAGE FOR AETNA MEDICARE PLAN (PPO) 95
(2014), available at https://www.strsoh.org/-pdfs/healthcare/2015_aetnappo-eoc
_b.pdf.
162. 42 C.F.R. § 411.37 (2014).
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exemption from a regulation to which Medicare proper is
obligated? If Medicare Advantage is in fact Medicare and governed
by the Medicare Act, federal preemption would negate the MAO's
own "contract" provisions with its enrollees. So which is it, are MAO
rights the same as or greater than those of the Secretary?
3. Harboring Private Sector Efficiencies Should Include Collections
Practices
It makes little sense for courts to assume that private health
insurers need the threat of double damages to effectively obtain
reimbursements. Part of the rationale for using the private sector to
administer Medicare benefits is to harness its efficiencies, meaning
that a smaller provider should be able to effectively coordinate
benefits for its limited number of enrollees and not make as many
improper overpayments. The federal government serviced nearly
38 million Medicare beneficiaries in 2014, whereas all Medicare
Advantage plans collectively only serviced 15.7 million
beneficiaries. In that year, six insurers serviced 72% of that total:
United Healthcare (20%), Humana (17%), Blue Cross Blue Shield
(BCBS) affiliated plans (17%), Kaiser Permanente (8%), Aetna
(7%), and Cigna (3%).' CA So of all Medicare Advantage enrollees,
Aetna serviced only about 1.12 million. While still a considerable
number of people, it is certainly not 38 million. The United States
needs to encourage involved parties to initiate recoveries on its
behalf because it does not have the resources to actively monitor
and take action in the claims of 38 million people. It is not rational
to believe that Congress intended to provide a private insurer-
which has entire departments devoted to all recoveries (not just
secondary payer recoveries) and services such a limited number of
Medicare beneficiaries-with exactly the same provisions intended
to assist the government's vast recovery efforts. As the magistrate in
McDonald noted, the idea was to capture the efficiencies of the
private sector, not duplicate the government program. And that
included utilizing their efficient subrogation practices.
There remains one other fundamental problem courts will
soon have trouble reconciling when assuming congressional intent
regarding MAOs. Pursuant to the Saving Medicare and Repaying
Taxpayers (SMART) Act of 2012, the "Secretary shall maintain and
163. Medicare Advantage Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
164. Id.
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make available to individuals to whom items and services are
furnished under this title . . . access to information on claims for
such items and services (including payment amounts for
such claims) . . . . Such access shall be provided . . . through a
,,165website ....
The statute goes on to outline a process through which parties
can self-determine conditional payment reimbursement amounts
that can be relied upon at settlement. As stated above, because
MAOs and Medicare proper do not share claim data, the Medicare
Secondary Payer Recovery Portal (MSPRP) created by CMS' 66 will
not be helpful in self-determining Medicare Advantage conditional
payments. So on January 2, 2016, when the first suit is filed against
an MAO for violating the Medicare Act by not providing web access
to conditional payment information, what will the courts' position
on congressional intent be then?
It is not disputed that Medicare Advantage is in fact Medicare.
Medicare Advantage plans are created by Part C of the Medicare
Act 167 and, as such, should be viewed as fundamentally the same as
traditional Medicare from a base benefits standpoint. MAOs must
provide exactly the same benefits as the government but may
provide benefits in excess of what the government-run program
provides. The idea of capturing the efficiencies of the private sector
is that private health insurers have networks and pharmacy and
durable medical equipment plans that cost less and provide better
services than the government program; therefore, if the
government can pay those insurers to provide benefits for those
beneficiaries that elect to participate, everyone wins. If an MAO can
incentivize more enrollments through enhanced benefits, the
chances of it profiting from beneficiaries who underutilize benefits
will likely increase. It is important to never lose sight that these are
private health insurance companies in the business of making
money.
The courts have generally agreed that the purpose of the MSP
is to help the government recover conditional payments, with the
idea being that the beneficiary is more aware of who may be
responsible for his expenses and, without the double damages
provision, may not be motivated to pursue the primary payer on
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b) (2) (B) (vii) (II) (2012); see also 42 C.F.R. § 411.39(b).
166. Welcom to the MSPRP, MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER REcOVERY PORTAL,
https://www.cob.cms.hhs.gov/MSPRP/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21.
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the government's behalf.16 But an MAO does not require the same
incentive, as its profitability should serve as sufficient motivation to
spur its recovery actions. Because the MAO has the same powers as
the Secretary, it is completely within an MAO's power to elect to
waive or compromise recoveries, again affecting nothing but its
own bottom line. With the capitation rate fixed, how an MAO
elects to make business decisions should be irrelevant to Congress
so long as it provides at least the same benefits as traditional
Medicare.
V. CONCLUSION
Not only is there no evidence of congressional intent to
provide MAOs a private cause of action in federal court under the
MSP, there was no reason for it given their total autonomy from the
federal government. The Third Circuit in In re Avandia actually
relied upon the absence of express congressional intent to arrive at
its conclusion that, had Congress wanted to deprive MAOs of the
right to bring a private cause of action, it could have done so.
Clever as that argument may be, it is not for the courts to legislate
from the bench and the law only expressly provides MAOs with the
right to bill for reimbursement. Medicare HMOs, Medicare
Advantage's predecessor, operating under nearly identical statutory
provisions, were held by the Sixth Circuit in 2003 to have only a
contractual right of reimbursement. 69 Yet some courts use the
existence of Medicare HMOs prior to the enactment of the MSP to
show that Congress was aware of such private entities providing
Medicare benefits and obviously intended MSP recovery rights to
include them. The courts have resorted to disregarding the express
group health plan condition in the private cause of action because
reading it otherwise would exclude non-group health applications.
However, when the MSP was revised in 1986, Congress did
expressly itemize all forms of non-group health plans, and it was
when Congress subsequently renumbered the MSP sections that
the conflicting language was created. Without evidence of
congressional intent to the contrary, how can one know that
168. See, e.g., Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 524-25 (8th
Cir. 2007).
169. Care Choices HMO v. Engstrom, 330 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2003). Although
the court cites 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(e)(4), the provisions found in § 1395w
-22 (a) (4) are nearly identical and the conclusions should be the same.
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Congress did not purposefully change the application to only
group health plans? Right or wrong, the statute unambiguously says
what it says. It is up to Congress, not the courts, to change the law.
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